Abstract Ostrovsky generalized the stable marriage model of Gale and Shapley to a model on an acyclic directed graph, and showed the existence of a chain stable allocation under the conditions called sameside substitutability and cross-side complementarity. In this paper, we extend Ostrovsky's model and the concepts of same-side substitutability and cross-side complementarity by using value functions which are defined on integral vectors and allow indifference. We give a characterization of chain stability under the extended versions of same-side substitutability and cross-side complementarity, and develop an algorithm which always finds a chain stable allocation. We also verify that twisted M ♮ -concave functions, which are variants of M ♮ -concave functions central to discrete convex analysis, satisfy these extended conditions. For twisted M ♮ -concave value functions of the agents, we analyze the time-complexity of our algorithm.
Introduction
Since the seminal paper by Gale and Shapley [9] the stable marriage model has been widely studied in such fields as economics, operations research, computer science and mathematics. Applications to various real world problems have been highly successful, e.g. the matching market for American physicians in Roth and Peranson [22] , school choice in Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez [1] , while theoretic aspects, particularly in game theory have also been studied (Roth and Sotomayor [23] ). Extensions of this problem have been introduced in various settings. In economic theory, Kelso and Crawford [14] showed the existence of a stable allocation in the many-to-one job matching model, if value functions of firms have the gross substitutes condition. In computer science, Gusfield and Irving [10] developed efficient algorithms for several optimization problems on the stable marriage model. On the other hand, the maximum stable marriage problem with incomplete lists and ties was shown to be NP-hard by Iwama et al. [12] . For the above problem and some variations, approximation algorithms have been developed (see e.g., Iwama et al. [13] and McDermid [15] .) Proofs of existence of a stable marriage/allocation for various generalizations have been made using Tarski's fixed point theorem [28] by Adachi [2] , Fleiner [5] , Hatfield and Milgrom [11] . In operations research, the recent development of frameworks in discrete optimization have led to further models of increasing generality. Fleiner [4] extended the stable marriage model to the framework of matroids, showed existence of a stable allocation, Eguchi, Fujishige and Tamura [3] extended the matroidal model to the framework of discrete convex analysis, a field developed by Murota [17, 18] as a unified framework of discrete optimization. Fujishige and Tamura [7, 8] also gave a common generalization of the stable marriage model and the assignment model of Shapley and Shubik [24] , by applying discrete convex analysis.
Remarkable progress was recently made by Ostrovsky [21] , who extended the two-sided market model (mathematically modeled on a bipartite graph) to a supply chain network model (mathematically modeled on an acyclic directed graph.) The model is based on a supply chain with various agents (e.g. manufacturers, brokers, consumers), who conduct bilateral transactions of various commodities. The model is described by an acyclic directed graph with parallel edges, where vertices correspond to agents, and edges to the possible transactions of one unit of a certain commodity. Preferences of agents are described by choice functions on subsets of edges. In this setting, stable matchings are generalized to 'chain stable allocations.' Ostrovsky [21] newly defined the concepts of same-side substitutability and cross-side complementarity, and proved that if choice functions of the agents satisfy these two conditions then there always exists a chain stable allocation, (see the next section for details.) Fleiner [6] also imported the concept of stability into the discrete/continuous flow problem, and generalized the lattice structure of stable marriages.
In this paper, we extend Ostrovsky's model and the concepts of same-side substitutability (SSS) and cross-side complementarity (CSC) by using value functions which are defined on integral vectors and allow indifference. We give a characterization of chain stability under the extended SSS and CSC. Our main result is that there always exists a chain stable allocation when value functions satisfy the extended SSS and CSC. We show this by giving an algorithm for finding a chain stable allocation together with certificates of stability. We also illustrate that value functions satisfying SSS and CSC are natural in the discrete convex analysis framework, by showing that twisted M ♮ -concave functions, a variant of M ♮ -concave functions, satisfy both extended SSS and CSC. We also give analysis of the time-complexities of our algorithms when the value functions of agents satisfy twisted M ♮ -concavity. The merit of utilizing discrete convex analysis, is that one can easily image and construct concrete examples of choice functions and value functions satisfying SSS and CSC. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe Ostrovsky's supply chain model and extend SSS and CSC, and in Section 3 we define twisted M ♮ -concave function, give some examples, and prove that twisted M ♮ -concave functions satisfy the extended SSS and CSC. We modify Ostrovsky's model and chain stability in terms of value functions, and show a characterization of chain stable allocations in Section 4. Finally, in Sections 5 and 6, we develop an algorithm for finding a chain stable allocation, and analyze its time complexity when agents' value functions are twisted M ♮ -concave.
Same-Side Substitutability and Cross-Side Complementarity
In this section, we briefly describe Ostrovsky's supply chain network model [21] , and extend the concepts of same-side substitutability and cross-side complementarity. The model in Ostrovsky [21] is based on a supply chain with various agents (e.g. manufacturers, brokers, consumers), who conduct bilateral transactions of various commodities. Each commodity is traded discretely in units, and the buyer pays the seller some price, which depends on the number of units changing hands. For instance, transaction of only one unit of a certain commodity may cost the buyer 10, while purchase of two units will cost 18, and three units 24. This situation is represented by an acyclic directed graph with parallel edges. Each vertex corresponds to an agent, and each edge to the possible transaction of one unit of a certain commodity. More precisely, a directed edge is associated with a contract consisting of the seller (understood to be the tail), the buyer (corresponding to the head), an identifier specifying the commodity together with the 'serial number' of the unit being traded, and the price accompanying the transaction. Thus, if some agent u is willing to sell to another agent v, up to three units of commodity A at the prices mentioned above, and up to two units of commodity B at 15 each, there will be five contracts represented by edges from u to v, the first for the sale of the first unit of A with price 10, the second for the second unit of A with price 18 − 10 = 8, and so on with the fifth standing for the second unit of B with price 15. An allocation of this model is specified by a set of contracts. As is in case of brokers who buy from manufacturers, and sell to consumers, each agent can participate in multiple contracts, some as the buyer, and others as the seller, as long as no agent is involved in two contracts of the same unit (with the same serial number) of commodity which differ only in price.
For an allocation X, let X u be the set of contracts involving agent u as either seller or buyer. For any given X, each u has a choice function which specifies his/her most desirable subset of X, this is denoted by Ch u (X) ⊆ X u . In these choice functions, contracts involving differing units of the same commodity are assumed to be preferred in lexicographical order, and indifference is not allowed, so that for any X, Ch u (X) is uniquely determined.
The key concepts in Ostrovsky [21] , are same-side substitutability and cross-side complementarity. For an agent u, denote by X − u the contracts of X in which u is a buyer, and X + u the contracts of X for which u is a seller. The preferences of agent u are same-side substitutable if • for any allocations X and Y , with
• for any allocations X and Y , with
It is easy to show that (2.1) and (2.2) are equivalent to 
3)
• for any allocations X and Y , with X
Presented with a larger set of contracts on one side, same-side substitutability says that the agent will not accept any contract on that side that was rejected in the smaller set, and cross-side complementarity that no contract on the opposite side that was previously accepted will be rejected. We now extend same-side substitutability (SSS) and cross-side complementarity (CSC) of Ostrovsky [21] to the case where value functions representing preferences of agents are defined on integral vectors and allow indifference.
Let E be a nonempty finite set, and Z and R be the sets of integers and reals, respectively. We denote by Z E the set of integral vectors x = (x(e) : e ∈ E) indexed by E, where x(e) denotes the e-th component of vector x. Here E and x ∈ Z E might denote the set of indivisible commodities and the numbers x(e) of commodities e sold or bought by an agent.
The value function of each agent is defined as a function f :
and the set of maximizers of
We assume that each value function f satisfies the following assumption:
(A) dom f is bounded and has 0 as the minimum point.
The boundedness of effective domains implies that a budget constraint is implicitly imposed on each agent's value function. We note that under the assumption, argmax{f (y) | y ∈ U } is well-defined if U ∩ dom f ̸ = ∅. We can define a choice correspondence C f by using the value function f as:
where q denotes possible quotas of commodities.
For any x, y ∈ Z E , the vectors x ∧ y and x ∨ y in Z E are defined by (x ∧ y)(e) = min{x(e), y(e)}, (x ∨ y)(e) = max{x(e), y(e)} (e ∈ E).
In order to define (SSS) and (CSC) for value functions, we assume that E is partitioned into
For any vector x ∈ Z E , we respectively denote by x + and x − the subvectors of x on E + and E − . The following property is a natural extension of (SSS) and (CSC). We say that a value function f :
). We will give a class of functions with SSS-CSC property in the next section.
A value function with SSS-CSC property has the following properties, which are used in Sections 4 and 5. Lemma 2.1.
Proof. We will prove the case where z
obviously holds, we have
Lemma 2.2. Let f : Z E → R ∪ {−∞} be a function with SSS-CSC property on (E
Proof. Let z 3 be the vector defined by z
we have x(e) < z 2 (e) from the assumption, and hence, x
− (e) from the first inequality z
− (e). Thus, we have x
Since z
hold, by using (a) in SSS-CSC property for z 1 , z 3 , and x, we can show x ∈ argmax{f (y) | y ≤ z 1 } in precisely the same way as above.
M ♮ -Concave Functions and Twisted M ♮ -Concave Functions
In this section, we give a useful class of functions with SSS-CSC property. Let E be a nonempty finite set. Given a vector x ∈ Z E , its positive support and negative support are defined by
For each S ⊆ E, we denote by χ S the characteristic vector of S defined by χ S (e) = 1 if e ∈ S; otherwise 0, and simply write χ e instead of χ {e} for each e ∈ E. An M-concave function defined by Murota [17, 18] is a function f :
From (M-EXC), the effective domain of an M-concave function lies on a hyperplane {y ∈ R E | y(E) = constant}, where
The concept of M ♮ -concavity which is a variant of M-concavity was proposed by Murota and Shioura [20] . Let 0 denote a new element not in E and define
Namely, an M ♮ -concave function is a function obtained as the projection of an M-concave function. Conversely, an M ♮ -concave function f determines the corresponding M-concave function f by
An M ♮ -concave function can also be defined by using the following exchange property.
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Theorem 3.1 (Murota and Shioura [20]). A function
f : Z E → R ∪ {−∞} with dom f ̸ = ∅ is M ♮ -
concave if and only if it satisfies
where we assume χ 0 is the zero vector on E.
An M ♮ -concave function has nice features as a value function, e.g., submodularity, natural generalizations of gross substitutability, single improvement property and substitutability (see Murota [19] , Fujishige and Tamura [8] for details.)
As in Section 2, let E + and E − be a partition of
Twisted M ♮ -concave functions are generalizations of the class of functions called GM-concave functions in Sun and Yang [26] . We give some simple examples of M ♮ -concave and twisted M ♮ -concave functions.
Example 3.1. We call a nonempty family T of subsets of E a laminar family if
X ∩ Y = ∅, X ⊆ Y or Y ⊆ X holds for every X, Y ∈ T .
For a laminar family T and a family of univariate concave functions f
is called a laminar concave function. [19] .) For a partition (E + , E − ) of E, the function defined by 
It is known that a laminar concave function is M
and for E,
Similarly, the function defined by Murota [19] .) Hence the function defined by 
Proof. Let f be an M ♮ -concave function satisfying (3.1). We begin by making some observations on a pair x 1 , x 2 with x 1 ∈ argmax{f (y) | y ≤ z 1 } and x 2 ∈ argmax{f (y) | y ≤ z 2 } not satisfying (3.2). Since (3.2) does not hold, there must exist e ∈ E such that either min{z and x 2 (e) > x 1 (e). In both cases, e ∈ supp + (tw(
Let x 1 = tw(tw(x 1 ) − χ e + χ e ′ ) and x 2 = tw(tw(x 2 ) + χ e − χ e ′ ). If e ∈ E + then x 1 (e) = x 1 (e) − 1 ≤ z 1 (e) and x 2 (e) = x 2 (e) + 1 ≤ z 2 (e) hold; otherwise, x 1 (e) = x 1 (e) + 1 ≤ x 2 (e) ≤ z 2 (e) = z 1 (e) and x 2 (e) = x 2 (e) − 1 ≤ z 2 (e). If e ′ ∈ E + then we have
. Hence x 1 ≤ z 1 and x 2 ≤ z 2 hold whichever e ′ belongs to. Recalling that
, which considered together with (3.3), in turn yields f (tw(x 2 )) ≤ f (tw(x 2 ) + χ e − χ e ′ ), i.e., f (x 2 ) ≤ f ( x 2 ) and hence x 2 ∈ argmax{f (y) | y ≤ z 2 }. Applying the same argument to x 2 and x 1 , we obtain that
To prove (a), we consider x 1 ∈ argmax{f (y) | y ≤ z 1 } to be fixed, and choose x 2 to be an element in argmax{f (y) | y ≤ z 2 } that minimizes
2) must hold, since otherwise, for x 2 defined as above, x 2 ∈ argmax{f (y) | y ≤ z 2 }, and the value of (3.4) for x 1 and x 2 is smaller by exactly one than that for x 1 and x 2 , which is a contradiction.
Similarly, for fixed
), satisfies (3.2), proving (b).
We can show the following lemma in the same way as Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.2. Let
f : Z E → R ∪ {−∞} be a twisted M ♮ -concave function on (E + , E − ) and z 1 , z 2 ∈ Z E be such that z + 1 = z + 2 , z − 1 ≥ z − 2 , argmax{f (y) | y ≤ z 1 } ̸ = ∅, and argmax{f (y) | y ≤ z 2 } ̸ = ∅. (a) For any x 1 ∈ argmax{f (y) | y ≤ z 1 }, there exists x 2 ∈ argmax{f (y) | y ≤ z 2 } such that z − 2 ∧ x − 1 ≤ x − 2 and x + 2 ≤ x + 1 . (3.5) (b) For any x 2 ∈ argmax{f (y) | y ≤ z 2 }, there exists x 1 ∈ argmax{f (y) | y ≤ z 1 } with (3.5).
Our Model
Let G = (V, E) be an acyclic directed graph. For each v ∈ V , let δ(v), δ + (v) and δ − (v) respectively denote the set of all edges incident to v, the set of outgoing edges from v and the set of incoming edges to v. As in Ostrovsky [21] , the vertex set corresponds to the agents (e.g. manufacturers, brokers, consumers) involved in a supply chain, and the edge set represents possible transactions of commodities. However, instead of creating multiple edges to deal with different units of the same commodity, we use integral vectors defined on the edge set. Each agent v ∈ V has a value function f v on δ(v), i.e., f v : Z δ(v) → R ∪ {−∞}. We recall that each value function f v satisfies Assumption (A). We call x ∈ Z E an allocation. For each allocation x and agent v ∈ V , x δ(v) denotes the subvector (x(e) : e ∈ δ(v)) of x. We say that an allocation 
Individual rationality means that no agent would like to unilaterally decrease the number of units in any transaction he/she participates in. For a feasible allocation x ∈ Z E , a blocking path for x is a directed path P = (v 0 , e 1 
We say that a feasible allocation x * is chain stable or simply stable if it is individually rational and has no blocking path. Blocking paths are generalizations of blocking pairs in stable matchings, and represent a sequence of agents, each one buying from the previous and selling to the next, who would like to increase their transactions by one unit each (and possibly decrease other deals.)
We give a sufficient condition for a given allocation x * ∈ Z E to be chain stable. 
Lemma 4.1. For a feasible allocation x
Thus z(e 2 ) = x * (e 2 ) must hold, and hence, z(e 2 ) = +∞ by (4.2). In the same way as above, we obtain z(e i ) = x * (e i ) and z(e i ) = +∞ for i = 1, 2, . . . , k. Since e k ∈ δ − (v k ) and z(e k ) = +∞, the condition for v k in the definition of a blocking path, i.e., 
Let x ab be a variable representing the number of commodities traded between agents a and b. In order to describe preferences of the producers and consumers, we adopt the following
By using g α and a sufficiently small positive value ε, we can describe preferences of agents 1, 2, 5 and 6 by using the following functions: 
where h is the twisted M ♮ -concave shown in Example 3.1. By using h, we can describe preferences of agents 3 and 4 by using the following functions: (1, (1, 3), 3, (3, 5) , 5) is a blocking path for x. // In general, conditions (4.1) and (4.2) might not be a necessary condition for which a feasible allocation is chain stable. In the sequel, we deal with the case where each value function f v satisfies SSS-CSC property on (δ
. In this case, (4.1) and (4.2) are a necessary condition for the chain stability of a feasible allocation x * . To show this, we will first show that the following procedure decides whether a given individually rational allocation x * is chain stable or not.
Stability Check input:
an individually rational allocation
z, z ∈ (Z∪{+∞}) E satisfying (4.1) and (4.2) if x * is stable; otherwise a blocking path; Step 0.
O := E, I 0 := I 1 := ∅ and k := 1;
} then output blocking path P = (v, e, w) for x * and stop, k := 2,
, (we will show the existence of e ′ later) and set p( If Stability Check stops in
Step 0 then P = (v, e, w) is obviously a blocking path for x * . Hereafter, we consider the case where Step 1 is executed. Just after Step 0, for each w ∈ V , we have
for all e ∈ I 1 ∩ δ − (w). By repeatedly using Lemma 2.1, we obtain that
For k ≥ 2, just before the iteration for k in Step 1, we assume that
and consider the iteration for k in Step 1. We may abbreviate (χ e ) δ (v) as χ e if e ∈ δ(v), for example, for y ∈ Z δ(v) , we denote y + (χ e ) δ(v) by y + χ e . Let v and e be a vertex and an edge such that e = vw ∈ O ∩ δ + (v) and
We claim that there is e
By the description of Stability Check,
must hold. From (4.6) and (b) in SSS-CSC property for
, which together with (4.4) implies (4.4) . In the same way as above, (b) in SSS-CSC property for (4.6) implies that there exists y ′ such that 
Step 1. By backtracking edges from e by using p, we can construct a path P = (v 0 , e 1 , v 1 
Hence P is a blocking path for x * . We next consider the situation just after the iteration for k (and before updating k) in Step 1. In the same way as the proof for the case just after Step 0, by repeatedly using Lemma 2.1, we can show
By induction on k, it is shown that (4.3) holds just before the iteration for k in Step 1 for k = 2, 3, . . .. We finally consider the case where Step 2 is executed. Just before Step 2, (4.7) and
hold for v ∈ V and e ∈ O ∩ δ + (v). By repeatedly using Lemma 2.1, we have
* (e) < z 2 (e) holds whenever z 2 (e) < z 1 (e). Thus, Lemma 2.2 guarantees x * δ(v) ∈ argmax{f v (y) | y ≤ z 1 } for all v ∈ V , and hence, (4.1). Summing up the above discussion together with Lemma 4.1, we obtain a characterization of the chain stability in our model.
An Algorithm Finding A Chain Stable Allocation
Let G = (V, E) be an acyclic directed graph. We assume that the elements of V are renamed as V = {1, 2, . . . , n} in topological order, i.e., so that i < j for all (i, j) ∈ E. We deal with the case where each value function f v for v ∈ V satisfies SSS-CSC property on (δ + (v), δ − (v)), and also assume that the effective domain dom f v is contained in the box 
